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investment theory of party competition
The Investment theory of party competition (sometimes called the Investment theory of politics) is a political theory developed by University of Massachusetts Boston professor Thomas Ferguson. The theory focuses on how business elites, not voters, play the leading part in political systems. The theory offers an alternative to the conventional, voter-focused, political alignment theory and Median voter theorem, which has been criticized by Ferguson and others.〔
== Overview ==
The theory states that, since money driven political systems are expensive and burdensome to ordinary voters, policy is created by competing coalitions of investors, not voters. According to the theory, political parties (and the issues they campaign on) are created entirely for business interests—separated by the interests of numerous factors, such as labor-intensive and capital-intensive, and free market and protectionist businesses. In rare cases, labor unions act as major investors, such as with the creation of the Labour Party in Britain, but are generally overshadowed by corporations.
However, this is different from a corporatist system, in which elite interests come together and bargain to create policy. In the investment theory, political parties act as the political arms of these business groups and therefore don't typically try to reconcile for policy.
Within this framework, the Democratic Party is generally said to favor internationalist capital-intensive businesses (along with labor unions) while the Republican Party favors nationalist, anti-union, labor-intensive businesses.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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